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ABSTRACT
Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation played a pivotal role in the animal 
rights movement and the foundation of modern animal ethics. Us-
ing an analysis inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics, I will 
analyze the way in which Singer’s book is structured in order to un-
derstand why it succeeds in providing people with the moral moti-
vation to change the way they live. I will argue that the success of 
Animal Liberation is in large part due to the detailed, carefully cho-
sen, emotionally rich examples and the unusual way in which these 
examples are juxtaposed, structured, and presented. Understanding 
how examples can have motivational force, not just epistemic import, 
can help us, philosophers, be not only more rigorous, but also more 
socially relevant.
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Moral Motivation & Deep Changes
Among the many books philosophers have written about 
animal issues, Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation is undeniably 
one of the most influential ones. Many credit it with begin-
ning the modern animal rights movement, and some even call 
it “the bible of the movement” (McLean 2009; Varner 1994; 
Russell and Nicholl 1996; Morrison 2002). As Dale Jamieson 
notes, “While other philosophers have been more important 
in the development of the discipline [of philosophy], none has 
changed more lives” (Jamieson 1). To understand why Singer’s 
book has this power, I will draw on a surprising and unlikely 
ally: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian 
philosophers have been critical of utilitarianism; furthermore, 
Wittgenstein rarely comes to mind when we think of ethics or 
our relationship with animals. Yet, Wittgenstein has much to 
offer to those interested in advocating for a better treatment of 
animals. For Wittgenstein, good philosophy does not involve 
correctly applying an ethical theory or presenting a sound de-
ductive argument. Instead, the right strategy involves setting 
cases side by side; the result is a change in people’s perception 
and freedom from “the picture that held us captive” (Wittgen-
stein, sec. 115). Wittgenstein compares good philosophy with 
therapy: “therapies (if successful) effect what might be called 
a ‘change in sensibility’ in the patient; they alter some of those 
deep perspectives in terms of which experience is appropri-
ated, ordered, understood” (Edwards 134).
In this paper I will analyze the way in which Singer’s book 
is structured in order to understand why it succeeds in altering 
people’s perspectives regarding animals. I draw on Wittgen-
stein to argue that the success of Animal Liberation is in large 
part due to the detailed, carefully chosen, morally motivating, 
and emotionally rich examples, as well as the unusual way in 
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which these examples are structured and presented. Under-
standing how examples can have motivational force, and not 
just epistemic import, can help us, philosophers, be more rigor-
ous but also more socially relevant.
Juxtaposition and Repetition
When Animal Liberation was published, reviewers de-
scribed it as “unrhetorical and unemotional” (Lockhart ) and 
“stark and economical and analytical to a fault” (Green). Singer 
himself refers to his book as “an appeal to basic moral prin-
ciples which we all accept, and the application of these prin-
ciples … is demanded by reason, not emotion” (Singer xii). He 
emphasizes this point again and again; for example, he writes, 
“reason—not sentiment, not emotion—reason compels us to 
recognize the equal inherent value of [animals]” (quoted in 
Causey 53). Like Lesley McLean, I argue that much more is 
going on in the book; “there is an alternative way of under-
standing the persuasiveness of [the] chapter concerning animal 
experimentation that has little to do with … the application on 
our part of basic moral principles that we may or may not all 
accept” (McLean, 15).
Philosophers focus their attention, often exclusively, on the 
first chapter of Animal Liberation, which is by far the most 
theoretical, and they interpret the book as just providing a 
straightforward utilitarian argument. But for a philosophy 
book, Animal Liberation is unusually structured. About half of 
the book is filled with examples and descriptions: emotionally 
powerful, detailed, rich, and unusually ordered. What role do 
they play in Singer’s book? And, what role do these types of ex-
amples play in morally motivating arguments more generally?
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The traditional view in philosophy is that facts play the role 
of premises in deductive arguments. The examples Singer of-
fers do just this; they show us just how badly animals suffer 
in labs and factory farms. He offers many examples of experi-
ments done on animals that do not provide any substantial ben-
efit to humans. Singer is also trying to dispel the myth of Old 
McDonald’s Happy Farm by conveying just how badly farmed 
animals are treated, and how much suffering they are forced 
to endure on modern farms. If one holds the view that Animal 
Liberation is just one long utilitarian argument, the lengthy fac-
tual descriptions in Animal Liberation serve no role other than 
that of supporting the descriptive premises of a straightforward 
utilitarian argument. But if that were the case, there would be 
no need for such long examples, or for so many. There would be 
no need for two full chapters of well-crafted examples—a few 
reliable references would suffice.
As those of us who regularly teach the first chapter of Ani-
mal Liberation know, most lay people do not seem to find this 
chapter – or the ‘straightforward’ utilitarian argument in it 
– completely convincing. Yet, as I will later show, many lay 
people are persuaded by the book to change the way they see 
animals and, in some cases, even to radically change their di-
ets and their lifestyles. I want to suggest in what follows that 
this kind of deep change is due, in large part, to the fact that 
Singer’s examples do not just have epistemic import; they also 
have motivational force. 
This is because Singer uses examples in two specific ways. 
One way is to get someone to see something through a repeti-
tion of examples: to get someone to see what Brahms is do-
ing you show him lots of pieces by Brahms, and it’s easy to 
see what Jackson Pollock’s, Vincent van Gogh’, and Georgia 
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O’Keefe’s styles are after you’ve seen enough works by them. 
Similarly, Singer tries to get us to see what hens are like and 
what the production of eggs in factory farms actually involves 
by providing us with numerous examples and vivid descriptions 
of battery cages and common practices, such as debeaking. 
For example, after describing how debeaking used to be done 
with blowtorches, he writes, “today specially designed guil-
lotinelike devices with hot blades are the preferred instrument. 
The infant chick’s beak is inserted into the instrument, and the 
hot blade cuts off the end of it…this procedure can result in 
“blisters in the chick’s mouth, … a fleshy, bulb-like growth, … 
burned nostrils and severe mutilation … which unquestionably 
influence acute and chronic pain” (101).  
People often think that hens are stupid animals that natu-
rally and happily make eggs. To show us what hens are really 
like, and to trigger some empathy for them, Singer provides us 
with a lot of examples and vibrant descriptions of what kinds of 
things hens do naturally, and what they do in captivity.
A more interesting tactic Singer uses consists in the juxta-
position of examples to compare X and Y to get us to see what 
X is like. In order to understand the power of such analogies, 
it helps to turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein. In Philosophical In-
vestigations, Wittgenstein says that, “A perspicuous presenta-
tion produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing 
connections.’ Hence the importance of finding and inventing 
intermediate cases” (Wittgenstein sec. 122). The idea here is 
that finding a good comparison can help us see something in 
a different light, and thus develop a better understanding. This 
strategy–often involved by philosophers writing in a Wittgen-
steinian tradition–does not involve making a deductive argu-
ment. Rather, it is focused on finding or carefully crafting good 
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analogies and setting cases side by side. This strategy allows us 
to see something we had not seen before. In his book on Witt-
genstein’s ethics, Ethics without Philosophy, James Edwards 
offers a useful example to illustrate how this works. He asks us 
to imagine that Bob “is impressed with Eudora Welty’s writing 
and decides that she is the great writer of the American South” 
(Edwards 130). How can Mary change Bob’s mind? One way 
of doing so is to employ a common technique: Mary can get 
Bob to read a story with a similar theme by Faulkner, says Ed-
wards, in the hope that he will then see that in comparison to 
Faulkner, Welty’s writing is facile and lightweight (Edwards 
130). Mary won’t be able to force Bob to agree with her, but 
she hopes that this ‘object of comparison’ will help him see 
Welty’s work differently. Whether Mary or Bob are right in 
their literary judgements does not matter; what matters is that 
this kind of juxtaposition is a useful method we might employ 
to get people to change their perspectives on something they 
often take for granted.
What Singer tries to achieve in Animal Liberation is much 
more difficult than getting people to change their minds about 
Eudora Welty. He is attempting to change the attitudes we have 
about non-human animals, attitudes which have been part of 
our society for thousands of years and which have been incul-
cated into us since we were kids. Getting us to view non-hu-
man animals with respect and moral consideration is very hard. 
However, dogs are treated with some respect and consideration 
in Western societies; they are better off than most other ani-
mals. Singer is aware of this fact, and he uses it to organize the 
cases he presents to us. In chapter 2, after telling us about mili-
tary and psychological experiments done on chimpanzees and 
monkeys, he continues by telling us about experiments done on 
dogs. We are drawn in, and we sympathize with the dogs. But 
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Singer knows that most experiments are done on rats, not dogs, 
and that most people are not sympathetic to rats. What Singer 
does next is put dogs and rats ‘side by side’ by describing, in 
excruciating detail, one experiment done on dogs, then a few 
similar experiments done on rats, then another on dogs, and 
then yet another few experiments done on rats, etc. The experi-
ments are often similar, involving, for example, dogs receiving 
inescapable electric shocks which lead to “defecation, urina-
tion, yelping and shrieking, trembling, attacking the apparatus 
and so on” (45) and a variety of studies where rats received 
inescapable electric shocks which lead to fear, aggressive-
ness, and injuries (48-49). As we read about these experiments, 
many of us feel horrified at the conditions he describes, and it 
becomes irrelevant whether the experiment is done on dogs or 
rats. The experiments are all alike and we come to realize that 
it doesn’t matter whether the electric shocks are given to a rat’s 
or a dog’s legs, or whether a dog or a rat is vomiting or dying.
The dog examples act as ‘intermediate cases’; we can sym-
pathize with the dogs and we generally see them as worthy of 
moral consideration. By placing the rat examples side by side 
with the dog examples, Singer makes us see that rats also de-
serve moral consideration. He also does this by drawing analo-
gies between dogs and pigs, and then between cows and other 
mammals. To describe what he does, Singer could say, as Witt-
genstein does, “I wanted to put that picture before him, and his 
acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined 
to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with 
this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of 
looking at things” (Wittgenstein sec. 144). Singer enlarges our 
circle of compassion not with a deductive argument about rats 
and dogs, but by building on our existing notions and with the 
force of his analogies.
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The Roles of Examples
Most of Animal Liberation is made up of factual data, ex-
perts’ testimonies, historical remarks, and excerpts from scien-
tific and agricultural journals. These are various kinds of pieces 
of evidence that serve the same purpose as evidence in court. To 
support his descriptive claims about how animals are raised in 
factory farms, Singer cites, for example, excerpts from agricul-
tural journals such as Poultry Digest, Poultry Science, World’s 
Poultry Science Journal, Broiler Industry, Farming Express, 
Applied Animal Ethology, Poultry World, Poultry Tribune, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, American Agriculturalist, Farmer 
and Stockbreeder, Avian Diseases, Feedstuff, Farmer’s Weekly, 
Journal of Animal Science, Hog Farm Management, and Farm 
Journal. For example, he quotes John MacFarlane, the vice 
president of the Livestock Conservation, Inc. who describes, in 
his article “Animals Into Meat: A Report of the Pre-Slaughter 
Handling of Livestock,” the process of shackling cows around 
one leg, hoisting them into the air and hanging them upside 
down before slaughter: “When a heavy iron chain is clamped 
around the leg of a heavy beef animal weighing between 1,000 
and 2,000 pounds, and the steer is jerked off its feet, the skin 
will open and slip away from the bone. The canon bone will 
often be snapped or fractured” (Singer 154). He often lets the 
industry speak for itself to show just how cruel its practices 
are and how unintuitive and inhumane their views are in terms 
of  animals rights. He does the same thing with animal experi-
ments, naming individual researchers and quoting long pas-
sages where they describe what they do to animals in their own 
words.
Wittgenstein compares discussions about ethics with aes-
thetic discussions which are “like discussions in a court of 
law, where you try to ‘clear up the circumstances’ of the action 
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which is being tried, hoping that what you say will ‘appeal to 
the judge’” (Edwards 129) The agricultural and scientific jour-
nals here act as the expert witnesses, witnesses whose words 
will appeal even to the most skeptical judges. 
These journals tell us, for example, how egg-laying hens 
are treated. Virtually all the big egg producers keep their egg-
laying hens in small wire cages, often referred to as battery 
cages.  These cages are stacked one on top of each other inside 
filthy sheds that can stretch the length of two football fields. 
The cages are more expensive than the chickens, so the chick-
ens are kept six to eight in a cage, with each hen getting about 
40 square inches of floor space – not enough room to stretch 
their wings. In these conditions, the hens cannot satisfy even 
their most basic natural desires, such as the desire to build a 
nest, dust bathe, or forage through the grass. The male chicks 
cannot produce eggs and they do not grow fast enough because 
they have been bred for producing eggs, so it is not profitable 
to raise them for food. All the male chicks are thus killed (of-
ten by being thrown into a grinder while still alive and fully 
conscious). The female chicks are debeaked so they will not be 
able to peck each other in the tight wire cages. Once their egg 
production declines, the hens will also be killed and processed 
into low-grade chicken meat products.  In the U.S., 98-99% 
of eggs now come from hens raised in this manner and these 
practices are becoming more widespread globally (Ilea 2009). 
To see the mindset and sensibility that allows people to treat 
live hens like this, Singer points, again, to what the farming 
magazines say themselves. Farmer and Stockbreeder, for ex-
ample, says:
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The modern [egg] layer is, after all, only a very ef-
ficient converting machine, changing the raw mate-
rial–feedingstuff – into the finished product – the egg 
– less, of course, maintenance requirements” (Farmer 
and Stockbreeder, quoted in Singer 107; emphasis is 
mine). 
Similarly, Fred C. Harly, president of a Georgia poultry firm 
that has 225,000 egg-laying hens, describes the hen as “an egg 
producing machine” (Poultry Tribune, quoted in Singer 107). 
Singer lets the farmers speak for themselves to show that these 
farmers–and many of us–are held captive by a picture of ani-
mals as machines which exist to benefit people.
Hens are, of course, not the only animals treated like this. 
Like many people, when I was younger I used to think that 
cows give milk because that’s just what cows do; I thought they 
were a sort of milk-making machine. But Singer dispels the 
picture I once had, and many others still hold on to. He ex-
plains that cows are mammals, and as such, they only lactate 
after giving birth. To force them to continually produce milk, 
dairy cows are kept in a constant cycle of pregnancy and birth. 
After realizing this, I began to think of cows as female mam-
mals and my picture of them changed. I realized that no mam-
mal just produces milk continuously for no reason. As Singer 
shows, they produce milk after having babies, so to get them 
to produce milk, we need to get them pregnant on a regular 
basis. Singer’s explanations are powerful. And they do not de-
pend on one being a utilitarian. The emphasis here is on “the 
picture that held us captive” (Wittgenstein, sec. 115), not on the 
utilitarian argument. In other words, Singer’s goal here is not 
to make a deductive argument, but to free us from erroneous 
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ideas we have about animals—ideas that prevent us from see-
ing them as they really are.
Chapter 5 of Animal Liberation further illustrates the point 
I am making here. The chapter presents a history of specie-
sism; yet in the beginning of the chapter, Singer clearly says 
that “though the material that follows is historical, my aim in 
presenting it is not” (185). His aim is rather to undermine “an 
attitude [that] is deeply ingrained in our thought [and] that we 
take as an unquestioning truth” (185). It is clear that the chapter 
is not intended as a premise or the support of a premise of a de-
ductive (utilitarian) argument. The chapter is rather intended to 
change the way in which we see non-human animals—in Sing-
er’s words, to change “the attitudes which we, as the dominant 
animal, have toward the other animals” (Singer 185). Singer 
even recognizes that while the other chapters were a “frontal 
attack” on this attitude, chapter 5 is separate and presents “an 
alternative strategy” (185). The chapter is intended to make 
readers see we have a certain attitude towards non-human ani-
mals because of self-interest and a set of religious, moral, and 
metaphysical assumptions that are now outdated (Singer 185). 
Singer hopes that if he shows us why and how we have been 
held captive by a certain picture of non-human animals, we 
may be moved to change our mindset and our sensibilities.
By changing the way they see animals, some readers might 
undergo deep changes; others begin to treat animals with re-
spect and even equal moral consideration, others might just cut 
down the number of animal products that they eat, while oth-
ers might just have a new awareness of what they are eating. 
Whether the change is drastic or subtle, there is still a shift in 
our attention, an ‘alteration in perception.’
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Of course, there are people who read Animal Liberation and 
do not change. Some people are simply not moved by the book, 
or they have beliefs that overpower the effects of the book. 
When this happens, animal advocates can continue to present 
to them more examples or analogies to get them to see what 
they see. If this doesn’t work, we can say as Wittgenstein might 
have, that the conversation has come to an end. But if this hap-
pens, it is very unlikely that deductive arguments can work in 
these cases either. If the combination of deductive arguments, 
analogies, and examples won’t work, it is the end of the discus-
sion and there is not much more one can do.
Yet, for the most part, Singer’s strategy in the book does 
work, so much so that People for the Ethical Treatment of Ani-
mals (PETA) used to give out copies of the book to new mem-
bers. Prominent animal rights activists such as Henry Spira, 
Ingrid Newkirk, and Matt Ball (as well as many other lesser 
known activists) have credited Animal Liberation as the prima-
ry influence for their involvement in the movement. As men-
tioned earlier, so many people have been affected by Animal 
Liberation, that the book is often referred to as the “bible of the 
animal rights movement” (McLean 2009; Varner 1994; Russell 
and Nicholl 1996; Morrison 2002). 
The Role of Theory
The fact that I have focused on the role of examples, as op-
posed to theory, in Animal Liberation might suggest that I am 
trying to argue that theory plays no role in Animal Liberation and 
that morally motivating arguments are not based on a theoreti-
cal framework. But, this is not the argument I’m putting forth, 
as I will show in the next two sections, where I turn to the role 
of theory in the choice, structure, and presentation of examples. 
Ramona Ilea
13
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
In her article, “Injustice and Animals,” Cora Diamond draws 
on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Simone Weil’s works to criticize 
a certain use of ethical theories to address injustices (Diamond 
Injustice, 118-148). Diamond focuses on rights theories, but she 
suggests that her criticism applies just as well to utilitarianism 
(Diamond 1978), and others (e.g., Foreman 2014) have applied 
Diamond’s arguments to Singer’s work. Diamond’s criticism 
is rooted in the recognition that when people see others be-
ing treated with atrocious cruelty, they sympathize and they 
feel moved. At this point, ethicists need work with the readers’ 
natural responses, and with the language that these readers are 
likely to accept. Instead, Diamond notes that some philoso-
phers like Singer and Regan bring up the language of rights, 
utility/happiness, interests, or equal moral consideration. Us-
ing this language is not going to change people; readers might 
not know how to respond, but they will not be convinced. On 
the contrary, this sort of talk “is by its very character likely to 
distort or trivialize a claim involving genuine injustice,” Dia-
mond says (2001, 125); using the language of rights or interests 
obstructs and misleads people. To talk about happiness, plea-
sure, or interests when people’s eyes are tearing up and they 
are beginning to feel something, is to set up an artificial frame-
work and ask people to fit their sensibilities into it. Not only 
will this not work, but it will make it seem as though we can 
talk about animals being tortured or dying in the same terms 
that we talk about the pleasure we get from eating meat. Or 
the reader might be tempted to see the situation in terms of 
competing interests (Diamond 2001, 125).  Bringing in the lan-
guage of rights or happiness will tempt people to respond with, 
“But what about my right to my property?” or, “But eating a 
steak makes me really happy.”  When people respond in these 
ways, Diamond says, the injustice is obscured, not illuminated.
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Yet, Diamond draws on an example given by Weil to show 
that it is sometimes, very rarely, possible to talk about theories 
in ways that have a powerful effect on readers. Weil’s example 
is that of Quaker John Woolman, who wrote about the evils of 
the slave trade in the eighteenth century. Diamond regards his 
work highly in part because “the power of [Woolman’s] argu-
ments comes from imaginative descriptions making evident 
the injustice [done]” (Diamond 2001, 125). These arguments, 
she says, open the reader’s eyes to the cruelty and injustice of 
the slave trade. Although Woolman appeals to rights in some 
places in his essays, “the injustice involved is not explicable as 
the violation of a right; rather, […] the vivid portrayal of unjust 
treatment stands on its own, and the understanding of injustice 
gives Woolman’s reference to rights the kind of moral serious-
ness they have” (Diamond 2001, 126-7).
Similarly, I have argued that the vivid portrayals of the treat-
ment of animals in Singer’s Animal Liberation stand on their 
own. The theoretical framework in chapter 1 places them in a 
theoretical context, but does not take away from their power. 
What Diamond criticizes is the mode of thought in which the 
direction of understanding is reversed, in which the notion of 
rights or interests shapes our understanding of injustice and 
the injustice is portrayed only in terms of a violation of rights 
or interests. If Singer appealed only to utilitarianism to argue 
that the way in which animals are treated in factory farms is 
immoral, his argument would not have the motivational power 
it does.
The motivational force of Singer’s book comes from the 
sense of the animals’ lives that he conveys, the power of the de-
scriptions and the analogies he offers, and his ability to change 
the picture that holds us captive and to gets us to change the 
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way we see things. By changing our way of seeing animals–
rats, chickens, cows, pigs, chimpanzees, sheep, and turkeys 
(each of which gets significant attention in the book)–Singer 
changes attitudes that have been deeply ingrained in us since 
we were children and are still part of the social structure in 
which we live. This type of change might disrupt everything 
from the food we eat at home and the meals we share with 
friends to the way we perceive others. These changes do not 
come easily and they usually do not happen just because some-
one presents a good deductive argument to us. They happen 
because something that they say and the way in which they say 
it touches us. We make a connection we have not made before, 
and we see something or someone differently.
Choice Architecture
A common objection to the argument I have presented is 
that I am making rhetoric and propagandizing a legitimate role 
for philosophers. What philosophers need to do is not be biased 
and manipulative, but to present their arguments in an objec-
tive, straightforward, and unbiased way. But, as Tod Chambers 
points out, this type of objection shows a common problem that 
ethicists (and philosophers more generally) have. Chambers ar-
gues that ethicists are under the impression that they “simply 
reproduce reality without also interpreting the world in a man-
ner that colors the reader’s perspective of those events” (196). 
As Chambers and many feminist philosophers have pointed 
out, stories, facts, and examples are told from a particular per-
son’s point of view and for a particular purpose. Philosophers 
often think that they are presenting cases in an unbiased way, 
but Chambers shows that the way in which they present the 
cases is often based on the author’s goals and theoretical frame-
work.
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One might argue that Singer bends over backwards to de-
scribe the treatment of animals in factory farms and laborato-
ries as objectively as possible. This is why he uses farmers’ and 
researchers’ own words in such an extensive manner. He lets 
them explain what they do, so he cannot possibly be accused 
of a biased characterization of their practices. To some extent 
this is true. There is no question that Singer does this, and, as 
I mentioned earlier, his reliance on primary sources makes his 
argument very powerful.
But this does not change the fact that, like all authors, Singer 
is a choice architect. Choice architects make choices that af-
fect people’s decisions (Thaler and Sunstein 3). When design-
ing a building, architects know that small details will impact 
people’s behavior. Other choice architects–doctors presenting 
various treatment options, salespeople describing a product’s 
qualities, politicians or parents presenting information, or a 
software engineer designing an app–know, or should know, 
this and make careful well-thought out choices, keeping in 
mind that every small and apparently insignificant detail mat-
ters. As Thaler and Sunstein point out, “Choice architecture, 
both good and bad, is pervasive and unavoidable, and it greatly 
affects our decisions” (255). Authors–including those of us that 
are philosophers–cannot avoid being choice architects. When 
presenting an argument, we need to stick to the truth. But we 
also need to think carefully about the language we use, the 
examples we present, and the way we present these examples 
because these choices have an impact on our readers.
Earlier in this paper I pointed out, for example, that Singer 
alternates his examples of experiments done on dogs with ex-
amples of experiments done on rats. A number of readers of an 
earlier draft of this paper suggested that this is manipulative. 
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Singer has carefully ordered his examples to get the effect that 
he wanted: to make us see that dogs and rats are not all that 
different and experiments done on dogs and rats are extremely 
similar. What would it mean for Singer to present the examples 
in a non-biased way? What these readers often suggest is that 
Singer should have first listed the dog examples and then the 
rat examples—but this would not be unbiased either. It would 
suggest that the proper way to see experiments on animals is 
to group the experiments in categories based on the species 
of animal being experimented on. This order would suggest 
that species membership is the most important criterion, and 
that experiments done on one species should be seen differ-
ently than experiments done on another species. Similarly, us-
ing pronouns like “she” and “he” to refer to non-human ani-
mals might be seen as biased and suggestive that non-human 
animals belong in the same category with human animals. 
But certainly using “it” would not be any less biased; it would 
suggest that non-human animals are closer to objects–chairs, 
tables, and telephones–than to human beings. 
Instead of trying to avoid choice architecture–an impossible 
goal–we should be aware of the choices we are making; the 
language we choose, as well as the structure and order of our 
examples, should be shaped by our theoretical perspective and 
goals. Philosophers who hope to change their readers’ deeply 
ingrained beliefs or habits need to pay particular attention to 
choice architecture. The content of our examples matters, but 
so does the structure and order of these examples. Peter Singer 
is a master at this. Animal Liberation, for example, is not a 
straightforward, simple utilitarian argument; it is a carefully 
crafted utilitarian argument supported by examples–effective 
and unusually structured examples–which take up more than 
half the book. By analyzing the choice, structure, order, and 
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presentation of examples in influential texts, philosophers can 
learn how to use examples to present arguments that are both 
philosophically rigorous and morally motivating.
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